Free Trade and Culture: An Alternative Approach by de Fazekas, Anthony
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 
Volume 2 Article 4 
1-1-1993 
Free Trade and Culture: An Alternative Approach 
Anthony de Fazekas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls 
 Part of the Law Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 3.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Anthony de Fazekas, "Free Trade and Culture: An Alternative Approach" (1993) 2 Dal J Leg Stud 141. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For 
more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
141 
Free Trade and Culture: 
An Alternative Approach 
Anthony de Fazekas* 
FTA and NAFTA allow special provisions for culture and culture-related industries, yet 
the definition of "culture" arguably falls short of what is necessary if the agreements are 
to ensure the protection and development of Canadian culture. A wider view of culture is 
recommended, and a justification test derived from constitutional law can be a means to 
clarify the exemption of cultural promotion from the pith and substance of the 
agreements. Together, these measures will be more effective in both promoting Canadian 
culture and minimizing trade disputes with the United States. 
L'Accord du libre-echange entre le Canada et Les Etats-Unis et !'Accord nord americain 
du libre-echange allouent des provisions speciales pour la culture et Les industries reliees 
a la culture, neanmoins, il semble que la definition de "culture" est insuffisante si Les 
accords doivent assurer la protection et le developpement de la culture Canadienne. Une 
plus vaste perspective de la culture est recommandee, ainsi qu 'un test justicatif derive du 
droit constitutionnel. Ceux-ci peuvent etre des moyens de clarifier !'exemption de la 
promotion culturelle, de !'essence meme et de la substance des accords. Ensemble, ces 
mesures seront plus efficaces pour promouvoir la culture canadienne et pour minimiser 
!es conflits commerciaux avec !es Etats-Unis. 
This paper will focus on the treatment of culture and culture-related industries 
under the Canada - United States Free Trade Agreement1 (FTA) and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement2 (NAFTA) international trade structures. The 
culture-related provisions will be analyzed critically in the context of political 
and trade law concerns. The changes to Canadian cultural safeguard 
mechanisms resulting from the FTA will also be assessed. Finally, this paper 
considers the effectiveness of government policies and enactments in this area. 
A principal conclusion of this paper is that there has been very little 
constructive rationalization of the cultural protective measures. Evaluation of 
* Dalhousie Law School, LL.B. anticipated 1994. 
1 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 22 December 1987, Can. T.S. 1989 
No.3, 27 I.L.M. 281, art. 1806 [hereinafter FfA] (Part A, Schedule to the Canada-United 
States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. 1988, c.65). 
2 Text as of 6 September 1992 (Department of International Trade, Ottawa). 
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the government's approach is difficult due to the lack of comprehensive research 
studies on the impact of these measures on Canadian culture, and on Canada's 
trade relationship with the United States. The little evidence that is available 
indicates clearly that many of the measures are unjustifiably intrusive, despite 
the harmonization resulting from the FTA/NAFTA. These measures are not 
directed clearly enough toward the accomplishment of cultural goals, and the 
means used to achieve these objectives unduly distort trade with the U.S. 
This paper suggests an alternative approach to the treatment of culture. 
First, a wider definition of culture is proposed, which contrasts with the existing 
standard that is based on protection of "cultural industries." Second, where a 
Canadian protective measure would, but for the cultural exemption, contravene 
some aspect of the FT A/NAFT A obligations, the provision would have to satisfy 
a justification test which is outlined below. The paper demonstrates how some 
existing measures would fail this test. 
Several preliminary comments are necessary. First, cultural sovereignty in 
the context of free trade with the U.S. is a highly sensitive and political issue in 
Canada; both economic and non-economic considerations are involved. Culture 
is inextricably linked with questions regarding national identity and sovereignty, 
and concern for these matters translate into political expectations. Accordingly, 
trade law issues cannot be isolated from these political considerations. 
Moreover, public opinion and lobbying have a direct effect on the multilateral 
negotiation process, and hence on the substance of trade law as well. Trade law 
is the product of negotiations whose nature and scope are defined by the 
domestic political conditions of the parties. An existing trade agreement is 
defeasible under extreme political opposition, as evidenced by Denmark's 
rejection of Maastricht. Therefore, the non-economic concerns of voting 
citizens with regard to the trade agreement will influence the drafting, 
implementation, and application stages of any agreement. As a result, the 
respective goals and concerns of Americans and Canadians with regard to 
culture will be considered briefly in this paper. 
Second, the paper does not treat NAFTA and FTA separately, because as 
the agreements relate to culture, the approaches are essentially the same.3 Third, 
despite the fact that NAFTA will result in free trade between Canada and 
Mexico as well, it is practical to restrict the scope of this paper to the Canada-
U. S. relationship because the impact of Mexican culture on Canada is probably 
minimal. 
3 NAFT A Manual, Department of International Trade, Ottawa (August 1992). 
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DEFINITIONS 
The extended cultural debate surrounding the free trade negotiations between 
Canada and the U.S., and then the trilateral round including Mexico, adopted the 
terms Canadian "culture" and "cultural industries." In those contexts, "Canadian 
culture" was defined as everything which makes Canada distinct, including: 
Canadian traditions, folklore, bilingualism, multiculturalism, principles of 
fundamental justice in Canada such as those enshrined in the Charter, the 
attributes of Canada's various regions, and Canadian history .4 In Canada, culture 
is regarded as integral to the preservation of the Canadian identity.5 Canadian 
culture expressed in various forms of art is the most relevant when it expresses 
this distinctness, which most often means distinctiveness from the United States. 
"Cultural industries," on the other hand, are conceptually more economic than 
cultural. The term essentially denotes the industries which provide the medium 
for cultural products: publishing, film, television and radio broadcasting, and so 
forth. It is the latter concept which has been subsumed in the FTA/NAFTA. 
CULTURE-RELATED PROVISIONS IN THE FTA. 
The cultural industries exemption reads as follows: 
Article 2005: Cultural Industries: 
1. Cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this 
Agreement except as specifically provided in Article 401 
(Tariff Elimination), paragraph 4 of Article 1607 (divestiture 
of an indirect acquisition) and Articles 2006 and 2007 of this 
Chapter. 
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, a 
Party may take measures of equivalent commercial effect in 
response to actions that would have been inconsistent with this 
Agreement but for paragraph 1.6 
The definition of "cultural industries" contained in the FTA includes 
publication, distribution of various printed material, films, video and sound 
recordings, and sheet music. Further exempted are certain radio transmissions, 
4 On many occasions attempts have been made to give Canadian culture a satisfactory 
definition. Perhaps the most complete definition was the one proffered by the Report of 
the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Queen's 
Printer, 1967) at xxxi. 
5 See e.g. B. Mulroney, (Address to the University of Chicago the Speakers' Forum, 4 
December 1985) at 6-7 [unpublished]. 
6 Supra note 1. 
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radio, television and cable television broadcasting undertakings, and all satellite 
programing. 
Article 2005 
The wording of Article 2005 has the effect of making Article 401 tariff 
elimination applicable to cultural industries. The removal of these protections is 
not likely to have a significant economic effect, however, because books, 
newspapers, and periodicals were not currently subject to any customs tariffs.7 
The Canadian tariff on records and recorded tapes is in the process of 
elimination over 10 years (having begun in 1989) from 13.7% and 11.3%,8 
respectively, on the items mentioned. In addition, the tariff on motion pictures 
and commercials will also be eliminated by 1994. The corresponding U.S. 
tariffs are generally lower, and will be eliminated over the same time frames. 
Northcote points out that these tariff eliminations will only have a significant 
impact on the limited sectors of record pressing plants, and film and video 
duplication activities.9 The rule prohibiting importation of magazines containing 
more than 5% of advertising directed towards Canada, as indicated in Schedule 
C of the Customs Tariff shall, however, remain operative. 10 
Other Relevant Articles 
Several other provisions are relevant to the International Trade in culture-
related industries. Article 1607(4) permits the Canadian government to continue 
with its "Baie Comeau policy" on publishing. 11 The essence of this policy is to 
require indirect acquisitions by foreign owners of publishing firms to be 
accompanied by divestiture to another purchaser, or payment by the government 
of fair market value if no such purchaser is found. 12 Article 2006 requires 
compensation to be paid to owners of programing subject to cable 
7 P.E. Steinmetz & K. Lemmon, "Impact of the Free Trade Agreement on the Cultural 
Industries" in P.E. Steinmetz & J.S. Stohn, eds., Entertainment, Advertising and Media 
Law (Toronto: Department of Education, Law Society of Upper Canada, 1989) at K-3, 
[hereinafter "Impact of the FT A"]. 
8 Ibid. 
9 W. L. Northcote, "The Treatment of Culture and Cultural Industries Under the Canada 
- U.S. Free Trade Agreement and In the European Community," 2 M.C.L.R. (1991) 27 
at 34. 
10 Steinmetz & Lemmon,"Impact of the FT A," supra note 7. 
11 P. E. Steinmetz, K. Lemmon, (Notes for a Presentation for the International Business 
ad Trade Law Programme of the Ontario Centre for International Business, 9 March 
1989) at 3 [unpublished], [hereinafter "Presentation"]. 
12 D. C. Card, Canada - United States Free Trade and Canadian Cultural Sovereignty 
vol. 2 (Victoria: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987). 
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retransmission by amendment of the Copyright Act. 13 Simultaneous substitution 
is also grandfathered by this provision. 14 
A contentious issue in the past was Bill C-58. 15 Article 2007 required that 
the Canadian government repeal the sections of the Income Tax Act 16 that were 
enacted by this bill. For the purposes of deducting expenses for advertising 
space from business income, the effect of the provision has been to define a 
Canadian issue of a newspaper or periodical as one that is printed or typeset in 
Canada. While the deduction will still be available for Canadian-owned 
periodicals, the material will no longer be required to be printed and typeset in 
Canada. 17 
The Retaliation Clauses 
During the negotiation of the Free Trade Agreement, Canada was given its 
"cultural" exemption, but the U.S. insisted on the retaliation clause of 2005(2). 
Just as culturaf sovereignty is an on-going concern in Canada, cultural industries 
are a growing sector of the world economy in which the U.S. is the undisputed 
world leader. Canada constitutes a large market for this sector's products. 18 This 
factor, coupled with the influence of the powerful entertainment lobby in the 
States, including its most "vocal" leader Jack Valenti, resulted in a determined 
stance on the part of the U.S. The result was the Article 2005(2) 
"notwithstanding clause."19 
Article 2005 operates as an unusual exception within an exception. Because 
the purpose of the cultural industries article was to avoid retaliation, if Article 
2005(2) were to be used often, then the exemption would become valueless for 
Canada. To date, the clause has not been invoked. Nevertheless, the situation is 
not encouraging, because the provision is shrouded in uncertainty about how 
and when it will be used. The little information available suggests that the 
clause will be problematic. 
In essence, when one party is treated in a discriminatory manner, contrary to 
the Most-Favoured Nation principle subsumed into the FTA/NAFTA, the 
13 Steinmetz & Lemmon, "Presentation", supra note 11 at 5. 
14 C. Fuller, "Fade to Black: Culture Under Free Trade" (1991) 801 Canadian Forum 5. 
15 See comments supra note 9. 
!6 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, as am., see ss. 19(1) and 19(5). 
17 Supra note 11 at 5. 
18 The U.S. had a 1.5 billion dollar surplus in cultural products with Canada alone in 
1984: John W. Warnock, Free Trade and the New Right Agenda (Vancouver: New Star 
Books, 1988) at 223. 
19 G. B. Doern and B. W. Tomlin, Faith and Fear: the Free Trade Story (Toronto: 
Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, 1991) at 247. 
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aggrieved party is entitled to invoke the paragraph. It would seem that no 
notification or consultation is required. Retaliation can be taken if it is of 
"equivalent commercial effect."20 Although there is some contention, the better 
view is that the provision is subject to the dispute settlement mechanisms.21 
Hence, if a protective cultural measure is taken by Canada, and the U.S. 
retaliates, Canada could challenge whether, in fact, the measures taken by the 
other party were of equivalent commercial effect. The retaliation clause would 
not be invoked, if the service or good to which the discriminatory measure 
applied was not included in the agreement. With regard to such goods or 
services, protectionist measures could be taken without fear of retaliation. From 
the Canadian perspective, the fact that retaliation may be taken in areas 
unrelated to cultural industries (for example, the lumber industry) raises a 
serious concern. The effect of such a turn of events would be to pit Canadian 
industries against each other, forcing a decision between cultural and economic 
interests in some cases.22 
Vague, Uncertain, and Confrontational Provisions 
An important problem with the treatment of culture under the FTA/NAFTA 
is the vagueness of their provisions. First, they provide no guidelines about 
what types of measures and what degree of intrusiveness will be exempt from 
retaliation by the United States. The relevant articles do little to increase 
predictability and certainty in relations between U.S. and Canada, which is a 
principal objective of international multilateral agreements. 
Second, on closer scrutiny of the provisions, it becomes clear that many 
important questions are left unanswered by the FTA/NAFTA. For example, 
what exactly is meant by "measures"? It cannot be taken for granted that. 
existing measures will be grandfathered as a result of the provision, although 
this seems to be the more prevalent view because where this is the intent in other 
Articles of the agreement, "existing" is specifically included in the wording of 
the provision. 23 Furthermore, the relationship between Article 2005 and the 
dispute settlement mechanism outlined in Article 1801(1) is also far from clear. 
Mr. Reisman, who acted as chief negotiator for Canada in the free trade talks, 
maintains that redress for excessive retaliation can be found under that Article. 
The wording, however, is neither express nor clear enough to preclude an 
20 Supra note 1. 
21 Steinmetz & Lemmon, "Presentation," supra note 11 at 6. 
22 Ibid. at 5. 
23 Ibid. at 11. 
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interpretation to the contrary.24 
A third problem with the exemption-retaliation clause included in the 
FT A/NAFTA with regard to culture is the confrontational nature of the 
provision. The lack of guidelines is dangerous because it leaves the Canadian 
government unaware as to the circumstances in which the U.S. would be likely 
to retaliate. This creates the danger that Canada may enact a safeguard in good 
faith, and the U.S might still retaliate. If, however, criteria were present for 
tailoring the measure at the outset, this might not have happened. The softwood 
lumber case illustrated the economic harm that U.S. retaliation can cause to 
Canada. 25 Hence, preset guidelines would be preferable to a provision giving 
wider scope for action but subject to retaliation. Suggestions concerning which 
guidelines could be used in justifying measures are discussed below. 
"Cultural Industries" as the Substance of the Provision 
The treatment of culture in the FTA is also problematic in its scope. 
Arguments proffered and speeches given made it clear that the concern during 
the negotiations, and hence presumably the intention of the culture-related 
provisions, was to preserve Canadian culture as a whole.26 It is not clear why the 
definition of culture protected the industries, instead of culture itself. One view 
is that culture has been defined according to the American perspective. 27 There is 
an air of reality to this argument. Statements made by Jack Valenti and certain 
U.S. Senators convey the impression that the prevalent American view regards 
culture essentially as entertainment, the product of industries to which an 
economic quantum can be attached.28 Further, they hold that these industries, 
and hence culture, would be subject to the free trade agreement but for the 
exemption granted to them. These industries should then also be subject to free 
market forces which would harmonize the industries and result in production 
through economies of scale. 
Another view is that pressure imposed by the cultural industries, motivated 
24 Ibid. at 12. 
25 For the seriousness of the impact: D. Cameron, ed., The Free Trade Papers (Toronto: 
James Lorimer & Co., 1986), at 205-6. 
26 Some speeches that declared protection of Canadian culture and cultural sovereignty 
as the purpose in the negotiations: Mulroney, supra note 3. J. Clark, Secretary of State 
for External Affairs, "Canadian Identity and Free Trade" (St. Catharines, Ontario, 20 
November 1987) [unpublished]. J. Kelleher, Minister of International Trade (Speech to 
University of Western Ontario, 22 January 1986) [unpublished]. 
27 C. Garos, Canada - United States Free Trade (Background, Issues and Impact), 
(Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1990) at 30. 
2s Warnock, supra note 18 at 223. 
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by their business interests, led to the substance of the exemption.29 Tax benefits 
such as the advertising deduction for magazines typeset in Canada included in 
s. 19 of the Income Tax Act, the Capital Cost Allowance for production of films 
that allowed 100% deduction from the running Undepreciated Capital Cost 
account every year,30 quotas for Canadian content, subsidies, and other 
protective measures contributed substantially to the natural growth of the 
cultural sector in Canada. This sector attained an incredible 445% average 
growth during the 1980s.31 Proponents of the cultural industries' position seem 
to equate the interests of the cultural industries with those of Canadian culture as 
a whole, often without explanation.32 
Whatever the reason for the failure to include a wider definition of culture 
(with a justification test to offset the vagueness), the move arguably was not in 
the best interests of Canadian culture. First, because of the approach taken, 
certain cultural expressions are excluded from protection, such as expressions of 
art through computer software (a growing trend), and the performing arts. 
Second, the present treatment of culture precludes the efficient division of 
resources to promote cultural objectives whereby assistance could become 
effectively dependent on creation of a real cultural benefit. As a result, cultural 
and economic factors become tangled. A justification test employing a wider 
definition of culture to include all present and future forms of expression would 
allow at least a partial solution to this problem. After all, the financial situation 
of a "cultural corporation" such as MacLean Hunter is only one aspect of the 
real issue - the nation's legitimate concern for the survival of its culture. 
Canada's situation is unique in this regard. Canada is a very large, fragmented, 
sparsely populated country, neighboured by a country ten times our population 
speaking the same language. Because of these factors, Canadian cultural 
industries operate at a comparative disadvantage.33 The U.S. has developed a 
highly extroverted, capital-intensive form of culture which appeals to 
consumers. The broad effect of its film industry, in particular, is felt all over the 
world. Canada is exposed to American film, television, and radio to an 
unparalleled degree. As a result of these factors, the statistics evidence an 
29 Card, supra note 12, vol. 1, at 92. 
3° For more extensive explanation of the Capital Cost Allowance see: B. J. Arnold and T. 
W. Edgar eds., Materials on Canadian Income Tax (Don Mills, Ont.: Richard de Boo 
Publishers, 1990) at 481. 
3I Card, supra note 12 at 8. 
32 R. W. Osborne, "Free Trade and the Cultural Industries" (Speech to the Winnipeg 
Chamber of Commerce, 23 February (989) [unpublished]. 
33 D. Crane, "Free Trade and Canadian Culture" Toronto Star (4 August 1986) A2. 
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alarming domination of the Canadian cultural sector by the Americans.34 
ALTERNATIVE VIEW 
Recognition of Cultural Safeguards in International Trade Law 
As a result of the cultural domination of Canada, it is unnecessary to take a 
narrow view of culture when international law acknowledges the right to enact 
safeguards in its promotion and protection. The reasons for this are manifold. 
The very nature of culture makes it an exception to general free trade theory. 
Every country, no matter how small, or how poor, or how inefficiently it 
produces cultural products, has the right to have and protect its cultural identity. 
This right is concomitant with national sovereignty and self-determination. 
Pursuing economies of scale which will result in a reduction of unit cost is 
generally advantageous, but not necessarily so in the context of culture. Art has 
a commercial value, and low production costs can be a legitimate, but not 
primary, objective. Art is more concerned with interpreting life in a way that 
illuminates its meaning, and values beauty and truth more than economic 
considerations of efficiency and profit. It is evident from the distinct non-
economic nature and function of Canadian culture that treating culture 
differently in multilateral economic arrangements is justified. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is an excellent source 
for the extrapolation of international trade law principles. A good case for 
cultural safeguards may be gleaned from various GA TT sources. Article XX of 
the GATT 35 recognizes the adoption in certain cases of measures otherwise 
inconsistent with the body of the Agreement, such as the Most-Favoured Nation 
principle. 36 Essentially, the provisions of Article XX allow legislative or 
regulatory measures, if such measures are of a "non-economic nature."37 
The preservation and promotion of culture is arguably an example of such a 
non-economic purpose. This is evidenced by the "Special Provisions Relating to 
Cinematography Films"38 which permit, for instance, domestic film quotas. 
Jackson notes that the reason for allowing this exception was that "its regulation 
was more related to domestic cultural policies than to economics and trade."39 
There is no defensible reason to regard protection of national films as a more 
34 Osborne, supra note 32. 
35 GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, vol. III, (Geneva: GATT, 1958). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Card, supra note 12 at 30. 
38 Supra note 35 at 43. 
39 J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of CATT (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie 
Company, 1969) at 293. 
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legitimate "non-economic purpose" than the promotion of publication of 
national writers, or the creation of national television programs. In essence then, 
protection of legitimate cultural interests is a valid government objective 
according to the Article XX exceptions. Preservation of culture, in general, is 
comparable also to the Article XX(f) exception for protection of "national 
treasures of artistic or archaeological value."40 
Several general justificatory principles can be extrapolated from Article 
XX. Card suggested that cultural safeguards could not be both discriminatory 
and consistent with international trade law. 41 The Article XX limitation on such 
measures, however, prohibits "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination."42 It may 
be inferred that discriminatory measures can be valid where they are not 
arbitrary. Therefore, discriminatory measures may be justified by arguing that 
U.S. cultural products threaten Canadian culture. 
Nations party to international trade agreements have also demanded cultural 
safeguards as a matter of course. In the U.K. and Australia, foreign television 
programing content is limited to 14%.43 All the EEC countries have provisions 
according subsidies and other benefits to their cultural industries. 44 The 
ownership legislation for radio and television stations in the U.S. matches that of 
Canada.45 Mexico has been allowed to grandfather a provision which guarantees 
native films 30% of screening time.46 
Although cultural safeguards are clearly recognized by precedent, they must 
meet certain classification criteria before they can be consistent with 
international trade law. The purpose of such a process is to ensure that the 
measure does not result in sterilization of perceived benefits under the 
multilateral agreement or the entire trade relationship itself. To achieve this 
purpose, the measure must meet certain criteria that ensure that the provision is 
well-tailored and most importantly, that it is directed toward a legitimate 
government objective. Criteria for assessing safeguards in such a way are 
outlined in the following paragraphs.47 
40 Supra note 35 at 43. 
41 Card, supra note 12 vol. I at (i); only non-discriminatory application of direct and 
effective cultural policy implements will be tolerated. 
42 Supra note 35. 
43 Osborne, supra note 32 at 7. 
44 M. Maggiore, Audiovisual Production in the Single Market (Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990) at 175. 
45 Osborne, supra note 32 at 10. 
46 R. McQueen, "U.S. Ranting Against Canada's Cultural Rights" Financial Post (18 
September 1992). 
47 Steinmetz & Lemmon, "Impact of the FTA," supra note 10. Card laid out similar 
principles as justification criteria: "legitimacy of domestic policy objectives," 
Justification Criteria 
Dominant Purposes 
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The first criterion is that the measures be directed at the preservation of 
Canadian culture. There must be a benefit to Canadian culture, such as, the 
presence of significant Canadian content. It would be useful to apply a principle 
of constitutional law in this context, namely the idea of "pith and substance."48 
The use of this rule would be helpful because cultural safeguards will always 
have both cultural and economic aspects. Although the purpose will most often 
be to create Canadian culture, there may be another intention or result: the 
conferring of an economic benefit on Canadians themselves as they will most 
often be the interpreters of Canadian life. The requirement of this criterion then, 
is that the "dominant purpose" or the "pith and substance" of the measure must 
be to create Canadian culture, rather than confer an economic benefit on a 
Canadian. It could be argued, then that the resulting economic gain to a 
Canadian - to the disadvantage of an American company or individual for 
example - would be "incidental" to the primary cultural purpose. 49 If conferring 
such a benefit in this context is discriminatory, in that partiality is shown to 
Canadians for the purpose of creating Canadian content, it would have to be 
established that an American company could not produce the same benefit to 
Canadian culture. Otherwise it could be inferred that the primary or dominant 
purpose was to accord economic protection rather than to create culturally 
relevant Canadian material. 
Such an approach would eliminate measures that place an unfair advantage 
in the hands of domestic cultural companies that produce cultural products 
intended for the American market. These corporations make use of Canadian 
cultural subsidies and safeguards to compete in the United States without.the 
creation of Canadian content.50 Utilized in such a way, our cultural protections 
bring little benefit to our culture, and might unnecessarily lead to U.S. retaliation 
or informal economic concessions on Canada's part in other areas. 
Rational Connection Between the Objective and Means 
The second guideline proposed is that there be a rational connection 
between the legitimate objective and the means used to achieve that purpose. 
"necessity," "instrument design," "efficient impact assessment," "intention," "minimal 
restriction test," and "pith and substance" are mentioned at supra note 12 at 58. 
48 Union Colliery Company of British Columbia v. Bryden, [1899] A.C. 580, at 587 
(P.C.). 
49 Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 App. Cas. 575 (P.C.). 
5° Card, supra note 12 at I. 
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This a typical standard in legal balancing processes.51 The criterion essentially 
requires that the measures be fair and "carefully designed to achieve the 
objective in question."52 In the context of culture, this means that the measures 
must be efficient. To determine whether this step is met, one would have to 
predict or examine the effects of the measure to ensure that a direct benefit to 
Canadian culture is actually achieved.53 
Minimal Impairment 
The next criterion, which comes from the realm of general legal theory and 
is also one of the components of the Oakes 54 test for justification, is that of 
minimal impairment. Because evaluation of a measure taken to protect culture 
involves the balancing of the objective of preserving and creating Canadian 
culture with the interest of maintaining the economic benefits of free trade 
(assuming that such benefits do exist), the economic interest should be impaired 
as little as possible in achieving the cultural objective. 
Proportionality 
The cultural objective, that is, the benefit to Canadian culture resulting from the 
measure, should be proportional to the detrimental effects which the measures 
have on trade with the U.S.55 The more necessary the measure is to achieve the 
given cultural objective, the greater the degree of justifiable intrusiveness will 
be. 
To recap then: 
(i) The dominant purpose must be a legitimate government 
objective, i.e. promotion, preservation of Canadian culture. 
(ii) The measure ought to achieve its objective. It must be 
efficient, and the purpose must be rationally connected to the 
means. 
51 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. (3d) 103. J. V. Calvi and S. Coleman, American Law and 
Legal Systems, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1992). Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, 247 US 251 (1918). 
52 Oakes, ibid. at 106. 
53 The panel in the FIRA case held that effects of the domestic policies are of extreme 
importance in determining their legitimacy under the GATT. See GATT, Canada, Report 
of the Panel on the Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) (2 
November 1982; reported December 1982). 
54 Supra note 51. 
55 Ibid. 
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(iii) The means chosen must impair as little as possible. 
(iv) The intrusiveness of the means should be proportionate 
with the necessity of the measure. 
(v) Preservation of the medium for culture should be 
recognized as a special objective of singular importance. 
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As will be discussed later, when the medium for Canadian cultural products 
is threatened, more intrusive means than ordinarily justifiable ought to be 
permitted. 56 
The Basis in International Trade Law 
The balancing processes suggested are drawn from Canadian domestic law 
since the tailoring of cultural safeguards will be done at the national level, and 
because the analysis suggested is familiar to Canadian lawyers. A further 
advantage in drawing these characterization and balancing tools from Canadian 
law is that there is more extensive domestic case law on these points than in 
international law. Consequently, Canadians have at their disposal more tools for 
assessing cultural safeguards. For example, there already exists a jurisprudence 
on complicated characterization issues such as "double aspect."57 
The approach outlined is not new to international trade law. These legal 
tools for weighing conflicting objectives (in this case cultural and economic 
ones) are omnipresent, mostly because they belong to the domain of ius rational, 
or rational law, that stems from logic and not from judicial decision based on 
localized facts and circumstances. It is not within the scope of this paper to 
argue the extent to which these principles belong to "general principles" of 
international law;58 a few examples of their application in international trade law 
will suffice. 
Similar "general balancing processes" were used in the panel decision in the 
Tuna case.59 This case dealt with a U.S. prohibition on imports of Mexican tuna 
for environmental reasons. In discussing Article XX(b) of the GATT, the panel 
spoke of the necessity of considering an "alternative measure reasonably 
56 See infra: section "Preservation of the Cultural Medium". 
57 P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. supplemented, vol. I (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1992) at 15-11. 
58 H. M. Kindred et al., International Law (Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in 
Canada, 4th ed. (Aurora, Ontario: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 1987) at 
192. 
59 GATT, United States, Report of the Panel - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (3 
September, 1991). 
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available."60 Consideration of "alternative measures" follows by necessity from 
consideration of minimal impairment, and, "reasonably available" suggests an 
evaluation of the proportionality of the measure. The choice of words suggests 
that in attempting to justify a measure otherwise infringing the other party's 
rights, less-intrusive alternatives do not have to be taken where the necessity of 
the objective is proportionate to the degree of the infringement. Further, in 
consideration of the facts in relation to Article XX(g),61 the panel agreed that the 
measures were "primarily aimed"62 at the objective involved in the case. The 
sufficiency of a primary aim implies that a secondary aim inconsistent with the 
obligation would not, in itself, defeat the measure. This language is very similar 
to the "dominant purpose" portion of the test suggested. 
CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT APPROACH 
The final part of this paper examines the current treatment of culture by the 
Canadian government based on the criteria laid out in the preceding Alternative 
View section. All of the safeguards cannot be submitted to criticism because 
,they are far too numerous.63 Instead, several key examples will be selected to 
illustrate the severe shortcomings of the government's current approach to 
culture. This section concludes with suggestions on how the criteria could be 
used to develop cultural safeguards which are consistent with trade law and are 
likely to result in the effective protection and promotion of Canadian culture. 
Grouping of Measures 
The Canadian government's approach has been to foster the development of 
the cultural infrastructure as a whole. Conditions were created to encourage the 
development of Canadian cultural industries. The measures employed can be 
divided into six groups: (1) revenue sources - direct incentives such as the Bill 
C-58 Income Tax Act amendment;64 (2) subsidies in the form of financial help, 
advertising, and marketing assistance to and from cultural organizations such as 
the National Film Board; (3) content quotas such as the 30% Canadian content 
requirement on the radio; (4) investment reviews under the Investment Canada 
Act.;65 (5) distribution bills, such as the Film Distribution Bill;66 and (6) 
60 Ibid. at 44. 
6 1 Supra note 35 at 43. 
62 Supra note 59 at 46. 
63 Card, supra note 12 at 3-26. 
64 See supra: section "Other Relevant Articles". 
65 Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985 (!st supp.), c. 28. 
66 Bill C-134, An Act respecting the importation into Canada of film and related 
products, 2nd Sess., 33rd Par!., 1986-87. 
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procurement policies such as those operative in the provinces with regard to 
material used in education. 
Harmonization 
The signing of the Free Trade Agreement has had a direct impact on 
government policy and legislative initiatives with regard to culture. Generally, 
apart from the changes brought directly by the FT A, the trend has been to 
downgrade cultural protections and subsidies. The changes that have been 
brought are uncannily akin to the objectives set out by the CBS Report67 and 
adopted by the U.S. government. 
The report stated its main concern: 
[the] failure of the U.S. government to voice effectively its 
objection to trade barriers that are imposed by foreign 
governments under the guise of polltical or cultural concerns. 68 
The study singled out specific irritants in various countries, including several in 
Canada. 
The Canadian government took a number of measures in implementing the 
FTA. It introduced Bill C-134, commonly referred to as the Film Distribution 
Bill in 1988, which would have enacted the Film Products Importation Act. The 
legislation was originally proposed in reaction to the dwindling share of 
Canadian distribution companies in the revenues of the nearly $1 billion 
industry, the lion's share going to American companies. 69 The proposed 
legislation would have increased the share of Canadian distributors in the 
Canadian market by 13% by giving them the right to distribute non-Hollywood, 
foreign movies.70 It has been alleged that this initiative was abandoned because 
of the pressure exercised in the U.S. by Jack Valenti, the CEO of the Motion 
Picture Association of America.71 In 1988, the Capital Cost Allowance was 
slashed from 100% to 30%. This was another measure singled out by the 
Report. Retransmission rights, duties on records and tapes, and the tax break in 
advertising (Bill C-58)72 were all slashed. There have also been indications that 
67 Services Policy Advisory Committee of the Office of United States Trade 
Representative and CBS Inc., Trade Barriers to U.S. Motion Picture and Television 
Prerecorded Entertainment Publishing and Advertising Industries (September 1984) (By 
T. Wyman). 
68 !bid. at I. 
69 Doern and Tomlin, supra note 19. In 1986 of the 1.2 billion dollars in revenues in the 
movie distribution industry, 90 per cent went to U.S. corporations. 
70 !bid. 
71 Fuller, supra note 14. 
72 See supra: section "Other Relevant Articles." 
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the government has exercised more caution in its use of investment policies 
regarding cultural industries.73 Most of these protections were singled out by the 
CBS Report which has played an important role in defining America's trade 
liberalization program in the area of cultural products. 
Lack of a Concerted Government Strategy 
There are two glaring problems with the current government approach. 
First, no consistent program with regard to culture can be discerned from the 
measures which have been taken since the signing of the FT A. Specific 
measures that create cultural infrastructure have been slashed, and policies 
related to this initiative, have been enforced less stringently. The alternative to 
the "infrastructural approach," blanket protection of the cultural industries as a 
whole, would be protection managed mainly on a "'case-by-case approach." 
This would focus on protection of Canadian culture by concentrating on creation 
of Canadian content through government assistance to specific projects.74 The 
latter method is usually preferable because it makes it easier to promote 
Canadian culture directly. By assisting individual projects rather than cultural 
industries as a whole, projects which bring no significant gain to Canadian 
culture can be screened out and allowed to compete freely with American 
cultural products. This more efficient method of protection has not been 
adopted. 
Robert Lantos, in his address to the California-Canada Chamber of 
Commerce, cites examples of the success of Canadian television programing in 
the U.S.75 It is encouraging to see a Canadian industry competing well 
internationally; however, the contribution of the programs he enumerates to 
Canadian culture was not mentioned, and on its face is dubious. Moreover, this 
raises a crucial question: why should Canadian cultural products, destined for 
the American market, be protected at the cost of Canadian tax dollars by the 
government if they are successful? 
In most circumstances, promotion of Canadian culture on a case-by-case 
approach would seem to be more appropriate than blanket exclusion of cultural 
industries although such an approach might not always be practical. For 
example, according benefits to publishing companies for each culturally relevant 
73 An example being the Prentice Hall affair: see Doem and Tomlin, supra note 19 at 
226. Canadian government supposedly caved in on investment review due to American 
pressures. 
74 Ibid. 
75 R. Lantos, (Notes for Remarks to a Luncheon Meeting of the California - Canada 
Chamber of Commerce, 22 September 1992) [unpublished]. 
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Canadian book could be an administrative nightmare. In this area, perhaps the 
only way to protect Canadian culture is to maintain safeguards which buttress 
the domestic publishing industry. There ought to be prerequisites for assistance, 
such as publication of a certain proportion of books by Canadian authors. 
The most obvious weakness in the arguments proffered in support of 
protection of culture by blanket exclusion of cultural industries is that there are 
no studies and few convincing arguments explaining why this approach would 
be the preferred means of preservation and promotion of Canadian culture. 76 It is 
relatively easy to cite the shortcomings of this approach given the example 
above of subsidization of domestic television programing destined for the U.S. 
market with little or no Canadian content. A case-by-case approach would be 
more consistent with our international trade obligations, and, in most cases, 
would result in a more efficient allocation of resources. 
The present cultural safeguards are inadequate because, while infrastructural 
protections have been downgraded, there has been no growth in the case-by-case 
support of culture. Institutions that have operated on a case-by-case approach, 
such as Telemedia and the CBC, which have been major funders of television 
programs and feature films of high quality and significant Canadian content, 
have suffered severe cutbacks. Not all of these can be written off as budgetary 
measures prompted by the recession or economic reform. That the CBC has 
sustained more cutbacks than all the other government agencies combined seems 
to be indicative in this regard.77 
Although it is not within the scope of this paper to predict economic 
effectiveness of particular cultural safeguards, certain general statements can be 
made. By dismantling some safeguards benefitting cultural industries as a 
whole, these industries could be allowed to compete freely. Because all cultural 
safeguards exact a cost, even if hidden, the amount saved through a reduction in 
infrastructural protective measures could be used for case-by-case funding. The 
result would be more efficient and advantageous to Canadian culture because 
projects of significant Canadian content are the ones that have the greatest need 
for assistance. "Americanized" or content-neutral products that have competed 
well in the American market already enjoy the advantages of a larger market not 
shared by their Canadian counterparts. 
Inefficient Measures 
The cultural safeguards as they exist today have not undergone revision 
based on criteria similar to those outlined in the justification test above. 
76 Card, supra note 12 at 57. 
77 Fuller, supra note 14. 
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Arguably, many of the measures are ineffective or unjustifiably infringe on 
Canada's free trade obligations because the "two misconceptions of Canadian 
cultural protection" are still evident in these safeguards. 
First Misconception 
The first misconception is that free trade will necessarily harm and not 
benefit the cultural industries. Although, in the end, successful lobbying on the 
part of representatives of the cultural industries resulted in preservation of a 
significant proportion of the infrastructural protections, the government argued 
that taking advantage of free trade could result in considerable benefits for the 
cultural industries.78 Evidence indicates that the shelter from competition which 
Canadian cultural industries have enjoyed due to government protections has led 
to higher unit costs in the industries, inefficiency, and lower quality.79 Based on 
the case-by-case approach suggested earlier, it would be possible to allow 
Canadian cultural industries to compete free of most protections where little 
Canadian content is included in the cultural product. Canadian cultural 
industries do produce such products, most of which are primarily aimed at the 
American market. Indeed, some companies have done remarkably well. 80 In this 
manner, tax dollars would not be spent on producing products with little 
relevance to Canadian culture, and, by competing freely, the companies involved 
could reduce costs and improve quality. If the same company later were to 
produce a film which did contribute to Canadian culture, then that company, 
having become more efficient through free trade, could produce culturally 
relevant Canadian material at lower costs as well. Consequently, it is 
conceivable that free trade could in fact benefit Canadian culture indirectly. 
Second Misconception 
The second misconception is that Canadian ownership will ensure Canadian 
content. In the publishing industry there is a positive correlation between 
Canadian control and the proportion of Canadian authors whose works are 
published.81 But, in the film distribution industry, for instance, the record for 
distributing Canadian films by Cineplex-Odeon, a large Canadian distributor, is 
hardly better than that of its large American competitor, Famous Players. The 
examples of Canadian film production companies and "Americanized" products 
with no significant Canadian cultural content both illustrate the fallacy of 
78 See Card, supra note 12, vol. I, at 74. 
79 Ibid. 
so Lantos, supra note 75. 
Sl Cameron, supra note 25 at 175. 
FREE TRADE AND CULTURE 159 
reliance on Canadian ownership. 
Standards 
Some might argue that the standards being used in this discussion are too 
vague: how is contribution to Canadian culture defined? Is Canada really distinct 
enough (from the United States) to determine whether something is sufficiently 
Canadian? However, contribution to Canadian culture and Canadian content can 
be sufficiently defined so as to make these standards operable as they are used 
every day when applying Canadian content rules. Card maintains that these 
criteria are "quantifiable and objective."82 A cultural product would qualify as 
Canadian content when it pertains to our "national heritage, Canadian cultural 
identity, stories about Canadians, their country, their way of life, and the issues 
that affect the way Canadians live."83 One can also refer to the definition of 
culture given at the beginning of the paper. The standards are not free of 
imprecision, but they seem reasonably operable. 
Examples of Unjustified Measures Related to Culture 
A few examples of inefficient, poorly tailored cultural safeguards are 
enumerated below. Perhaps the most useful measures to scrutinize are the 
Canadian Film and Videotape Certification Office (CFVCO) criteria. These 
criteria are used to determine the eligibility of a film or video for the capital cost 
allowance already mentioned. 84 They are also used indirectly to qualify for 
assistance for private film productions under the "Canadian Broadcast 
Development Fund." Further, the Canadian Radio and Television Commission, 
which has the power to grant broadcasting licenses and attach quantitative 
restrictions regarding Canadian content to their licenses, uses the CFVCO 
criteria. As their wide use denotes, these standards are at the very heart of the 
Canadian cultural regulatory scheme.85 
These criteria, however, would probably fail the justification test set out in 
the "Alternative View" section. Several guidelines are set out which are used to 
determine whether or not a film is "Canadian": certain number of "units" must 
be met in order to receive such qualification, a calculated number of units are 
obtained depending on whether the highest paid actor and other personnel on the 
project are "Canadian," 74 percent of the preparation costs are paid for services 
82 Card, supra note 12, vol. I at 21-47. 
83 Ibid. at 87. 
84 See supra: section '"Cultural Industries' as the Substance of the Provision." 
85 Card, supra note 12 vol. I at 87. 
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provided in Canada, and so forth.86 In other words, the criteria clearly fall under 
the second fallacy; it is assumed that Canadian actors and directors will assure 
creation of Canadian content. These standards would fail the rational connection 
requirement. Requiring the director to be Canadian may often result in creation 
of Canadian content, but the requirement is still not rationally connected to the 
objective. Just because a cultural product is created by a Canadian does not 
mean that a significant contribution is made to Canadian culture. 
PRESERVATION OF THE CULTURAL MEDIUM 
It has been argued that protection of cultural industries as a whole is 
reproachable as failing to confer direct benefits on Canadian culture, or leading 
to a confusion of economic and cultural objectives. In certain cases, however, 
such an exemption or interference that has the effect of ensuring Canadian 
ownership could be justified in limited circumstances. This would be the case 
where a medium for Canadian culture is not guaranteed. Because art without an 
audience has no meaning, its preservation would be directly related to the 
recognized exemption of culture in international trade law. 87 If it could be 
proven that due to vertical integration of film distribution, 88 for instance, 
culturally relevant material cannot find a sufficient medium, then interference 
may be necessary. 
Some argue that Canadian cultural industries provide that very medium, and 
that failure to protect them will lead to its disappearance.89 Proponents of this 
view compare the zero growth in cultural industries after 1988 to the 
phenomenal growth during the 1980s. They claim that the recession does not 
fully explain this trend, and that a guaranteed medium for Canadian culture will 
soon disappear. Due to lack of sufficient data, it is impossible to assess the 
validity of this argument. 
There is some evidence, however, that interference, particularly in the film 
distribution sector, could be justified. The film Black Robe is an excellent, but 
far from isolated, example. This Canadian film is relatively low-cost, of high-
quality, and critically acclaimed all over the world, yet it has gained little screen 
time in Canadian theatres. The essential problem is that the two major film 
distributors, Cineplex-Odeon and Famous Players, are supplied by American 
film production companies, and rarely allow screening of Canadian films which 
86 Ibid. at 14. 
87 See supra: section "Recognition of Cultural Safeguards in International Law." 
88 Film Industry Task Force, Canadian Cinema: A Solid Base (Ottawa: Supply and 
Services Canada, 1985) at 7. 
89 Fuller, supra note 14 at 6. 
FREE TRADE AND CULTURE 161 
are generally produced by smaller independent production companies.9o In 
addition, American companies have seemed to show a presumption against the 
possibility of success of a Canadian film. Despite the fact that these 
suppositions are now largely invalid, they still persist.91 
The example of film distribution shows that the approach suggested will not 
always result in curtailment of protection measures; sometimes it will have the 
opposite effect. In this case, preserving a medium is a legitimate objective. The 
various means to increase access for Canadian films would have to be assessed, 
and the least intrusive one chosen. Because there is little positive correlation 
between Canadian ownership of distribution companies and showing time 
granted to Canadian films, the best choice might be a quota for screen time 
devoted to Canadian films in all cinemas. The percentage could be determined 
by estimating the number of culturally relevant Canadian films of quality 
available compared to that of the foreign counterparts. 
PUBLIC BALANCING OF OBJECTIVES 
There is another advantage to the approach outlined above. Since the balancing 
of objectives in justifying safeguards will be more visible and defined, this 
process will serve to dispel many of the misunderstandings regarding culture on 
both sides of the border. The comments made on harmonization made it clear 
that there has been an "informal reconciliation" of American and Canadian 
demands with regard to culture resulting in a certain liberalization of this trade 
sector, even apart from the FT A/NAFT A provisions. If this process of weighing 
the benefits of free trade against the necessity of preserving culture had been 
done in a public fashion, then perhaps much undue dissention might have been 
quelled. Card has suggested an "arbitration tribunal for this purpose."92 Jack 
Valenti might begin to comprehend, if he chose to, that culture involves more 
than the business interests of the entertainment industry, and Canadian 
nationalists might understand that once the legitimate cultural objectives are 
identified, safeguards can be tailored in such a way to achieve these objectives 
without jeopardizing Canada's trading relationship with the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
The plethora of problems with both the cultural exemption in FTA/NAFTA and 
some of the faults of the protective policies and legislative enactments adopted 
90 Film Industry Task Force, supra note 88. 
91 Doern and Tomlin, supra note 19. 
92 Card, supra note 12, vol. 1 at 94. 
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by the Canadian government with regard to culture have been demonstrated. 
Assessment of all these measures would be beyond the scope of this paper. It is 
clear, however, that with more comprehensive study of this area, and by putting 
the criteria outlined above to work, the safeguards could be rationalized to 
maximize the benefits to Canadian culture and minimize the extent to which 
these measures "irritate" the Americans. The criteria are not claimed to be a 
perfect solution. Any judgment in this area will be value-laden, and a measure 
which seemingly meets the justification test from the Canadian point of view 
could still be criticized in the United States. 
Still, there are several advantages to this approach. A justification test 
would clarify Canadian objectives, and minimize U.S. retaliatory actions. 
Protective measures submitted to such criteria will be more efficient and result 
in greater benefit to Canadian culture. Further, such a justification process will 
allow the economic and cultural factors in this subject area to be more clearly 
separated. In cases where protection is not vital to creation of Canadian culture, 
cultural industries would be left to compete and they will eventually profit from 
free trade by learning to reduce costs and enhance the quality of their products. 
Protection of the cultural medium could also be accommodated by the proposed 
analysis. In essence, by tailoring measures according to these guidelines, free 
trade objectives and legitimate cultural purposes can be reconciled on condition 
of goodfaith on both sides. 
To recap then, the following approach is suggested. A wider definition of 
culture subject to a justification test ought to be adopted. A case-by-case 
approach would be a more effective way to achieve cultural objectives because 
economic enterprises resulting in little benefit to Canadian culture would be 
easier to screen out. In the application of the justification test, special 
consideration ought to be given to the importance of maintaining a sufficient 
medium for Canadian culture. The approach outlined is GATT-consistent, and 
although no such analysis has been set out in the FTA/NAFTA provisions 
relating to culture, it could still be applied. The approach would achieve more 
efficient promotion of Canadian culture, and as well, tailor measures so as to 
avoid the prospect of retaliation by the U.S. subsequent to the "notwithstanding" 
clause of Art. 2005(2). 
